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On April 20, 2005, after nearly a decade of lobbying by the credit in-
dustry, President Bush signed the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protec-
tion Act (BAPCPA).2 The publicly stated goal of BAPCPA was to make
bankruptcy less desirable so that debtors would stop abusing the protections
of the Bankruptcy Code.3 Although Congress was motivated by laudable in-
tentions, it is clear that BAPCPA contains at least one good idea that does not
work in practice - the credit counseling requirement.
4
Under BAPCPA, a debtor must receive credit counseling before filing
for bankruptcy.5 Not only did Congress fail to instruct judges on the proper
way to dispose of debtors who fail to meet the credit counseling requirement,
it also failed to consider the best way to educate consumers about debt man-
agement. This Note focuses on a recent Missouri case, In re Gee, and con-
cludes that BAPCPA's credit counseling requirement is severely harming
debtors who, like Bertha Mae Gee, are unable to receive credit counseling
and must forfeit the protections of the Bankruptcy Code.
1. 332 B.R. 602 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005).
2. See Press Release, The White House, President Signs Bankruptcy Abuse




4. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) (Supp. V 2005).
5. Id.
1
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I. FACTS AND HOLDING
On October 20, 2005, facing imminent foreclosure on her home, Ber-
tha Mae Gee filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the Western District
of Missouri in an attempt to stop the foreclosure. 6 She also filed a Certifica-
tion of Exigent Circumstances to Waive Debt Counseling Prior to Filing
(the "Certification").7
The Certification stated that, prior to the foreclosure sale, she had
struggled to pay an attorney who would file her bankruptcy petition.8 Addi-
tionally, she described her difficulties in physically reaching her attorney's
office and in communicating with her attorney.9 Finally, Gee stated that she
had contacted Consumer Credit Counseling ("CCC") of Springfield, Mis-
souri on October 20, 2005, only to find out that CCC did not provide coun-
seling on the first day that it was requested.10 Four days after her initial
request, CCC agreed to send Gee the paperwork she needed to complete the
counseling. 
1
Ultimately, the bankruptcy court for the Western District of Missouri
denied Gee's request for a waiver of the credit counseling requirement.
2
Gee then filed a motion to vacate the court's order denying the waiver,
which the court also denied.' 3 Despite admitting that Gee's circumstances
were exigent, the court denied the motion, because Gee had failed to show
that she was unable to obtain credit counseling within the five-day period
after filing her bankruptcy petition. 14 Because Gee obtained neither the
credit counseling nor the waiver, she was ineligible to be a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Code; therefore, the court dismissed her case.'
5
6. In re Gee, 332 B.R. 602, 603 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005). As soon as a debtor
files her bankruptcy petition, there is a stay of "all actions by creditors against debtors
or their property." 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). Furthermore, a Chapter
13 bankruptcy proceeding allows a debtor to keep her home by including mortgage
payments in her repayment plan. See id. § 1322(b).






13. Id. at 604.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 603.
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A. The History of Chapter 13
Consumers have been able to reorganize their debts under the protec-
tion of the bankruptcy courts since the Chandler Act of 1938.16 Under the
Chandler Act, the original Chapter XIII consisted of a debt repayment plan
under the supervision of the bankruptcy court. 17 However, according to the
legislative history of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, the Chandler Act's Chapter
XIII was "one of the least understood and most erratically applied of all
federal statutes dealing with bankruptcy or social welfare."
'' 8
Because of this lack of understanding of Chapter XIII, debtors were
often pushed into Chapter VII liquidation bankruptcies, even though the
debtors may have preferred to repay their creditors.1 9 Chapter XIII was only
available to debtors when the debtor's bankruptcy judge was familiar with
Chapter XIII and was interested in supervising a plan. Additionally, it was
21
unavailable to debtors without regular salary income.
In 1978, as a result of increasing consumer bankruptcies, Congress
amended the bankruptcy code by passing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 ("1978 Act"). 22 The 1978 Act encouraged debtors to file Chapter 1323
bankruptcy by providing for a broader discharge of debts and an increased
ability to keep their homes and other assets. 24 The intended result was for
debtors to repay more of their debts than in a Chapter 7 liquidation proceed-
16. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS
AND CREDITORS 5 (4th ed. Supp. 2005).
17. Id.
18. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 12 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5798.
19. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 117 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6077-78.
20. Id.
21. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 13 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5799. To be eligible for Chapter XIII bankruptcy under the Chandler Act, a debtor
was required to have regular income that came from wages, salary, or commissions.
Id. As a result, this requirement eliminated small business owners and welfare recipi-
ents from Chapter XIII eligibility, even though such debtors had regular income. Id.
To rectify this situation, the new Chapter 13 only required regular income sufficient
to fund a repayment plan. Id.
22. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
23. The Chandler Act used Roman numerals to denote different sections. Id.
When Congress overhauled the bankruptcy laws in 1978, it chose to keep the same
numbers but change the numbering from Roman numerals to Arabic numerals. WAR-
REN & WESTBROOK, supra note 16, at 7.
24. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 223-24. This broader discharge of debts included
even fraud and intentional torts. Id.
2006] 1103
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25ing. These incentives worked temporarily, as Chapter 13 filings increased
to about thirty percent of all bankruptcy filings in the years following the
adoption of the 1978 Act.
26
As part of the protections offered to a debtor choosing Chapter 13
bankruptcy, Congress included an automatic stay of "all actions by creditors
,27
against the debtor or his property." The stay was designed to provide the
debtor with a "breathing spell" to prepare for a Chapter 13 repayment
plan. 28 Therefore, the stay took effect as soon as the debtor filed a bank-
ruptcy petition, although creditors could petition the bankruptcy court for
relief from the stay.29 If a creditor chose to ignore the stay and continue its
actions against a debtor, the creditor could be liable for both actual and
punitive damages. 30 Finally, under the 1978 Act, the stay remained in effect
until the case was closed or dismissed or until a discharge was granted.3'
B. The 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments
In 2005, after several years of attempts by the credit industry to
strengthen bankruptcy protections,32 Congress passed BAPCPA.33 In his
25. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 118.
26. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 224.
27. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 121.
28. Id. The stay was designed to help the debtor prepare for a Chapter 13 repay-
ment plan, not to provide a way for debtors to hide from their obligations. Id. at 122.
To that end, Congress limited the stay to actions regarding consumer debts. Id. For
example, some of the actions the stay does not affect include criminal prosecutions
against the debtor, actions for paternity, and actions to modify domestic support obli-
gations. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
29. For example, a creditor whose interest is not adequately protected can apply
for relief from the stay, as can a creditor whose claim is secured by real property and
who can show that the debtor was using bankruptcy in an attempt to defraud the credi-
tor. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (Supp. V 2005).
31. Id. § 362(c)(2).
32. During House debate on an amendment to BAPCPA that would have af-
forded Chapter 13 debtors more flexibility in calculating their financial needs for
purposes of establishing a repayment plan, Congressman Henry Hyde said "let me
pay my respects to the creditor lobby. They are awesome." Susan Jensen, A Legisla-
tive History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 528 (2005). The credit industry spent millions lobby-
ing for changes to the bankruptcy code, but estimated that the industry would save
millions more through BAPCPA. Jennifer Brooks, Jury Is Still Out On New Bank-
ruptcy Law, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Feb. 12, 2006,
http://www.app.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060212/BUSINESS/602120357&
SEARCHid=73236216474327 (last visited Mar. 28, 2006). MBNA, which was one of
the companies leading the lobbying efforts, estimated in 2000 that proposed changes
to the bankruptcy code would save MBNA more than $60 million a year. Id.
1104 [Vol. 71
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signing statement, President Bush summarized the rationale for BAPCPA:
"If someone does not pay his or her debts, the rest of society ends up paying
them. In recent years, too many people have abused the bankruptcy laws.
They've walked away from debts even when they had the ability to repay
them."34
One change BAPCPA made was to restrict the automatic stay in mul-
tiple-filing situations. For example, in situations where the debtor had a
bankruptcy case pending within the preceding year and had the earlier case
dismissed, the automatic stay will terminate thirty days after the later case is
filed "with respect to any action taken with respect to a debt or property
securing such debt or with respect to any lease. ' 36 Essentially, debtors with
two or more cases pending in the preceding year do not receive the protec-
tion of an automatic stay.
37
BAPCPA also established a credit counseling requirement. Banking
and credit card industries lobbied for this provision in an attempt to encour-
age people with financial difficulties to choose options other than bank-
ruptcy.a Proponents of the credit counseling requirement argued that credit
33. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). The Senate approved BAPCPA by a
vote of 74 to 25, while the House of Representatives passed the bill by a vote of 302
to 126. See Jensen, supra note 32, at 565-66 (discussing the history of BAPCPA).
34. Press Release, The White House, President Signs Bankruptcy Abuse Preven-
tion and Consumer Protection Act (Apr. 20, 2005),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050420-5.html (last visited
Mar. 30, 2006). This view that debtors were abusing protections offered under the
Bankruptcy Code was not limited to Republicans. For example, Representative Rich
Boucher, a Virginia Democrat, said in a news release that "debtors treat bankruptcy as
merely another financial planning tool and file for bankruptcy for simple conven-
ience. These practices are permitted under the current bankruptcy law which allows
debtors to walk away from their debts regardless of whether they have the ability to
pay any portion of what they owe." Press Release, House Judiciary Comm., House
Approves Bankruptcy Reform Legislation (Apr. 14, 2005),
http://judiciary.house.gov/newscenter.aspx?A=475 (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (Supp. V 2005); see Lisa A. Napoli, The Not-So-
Automatic Stay: Legislative Changes to the Automatic Stay in a Case Filed By or
Against an Individual Debtor, 17 AM. BANKR. L.J. 749 (2005) (thoroughly discussing
BAPCPA's changes to the automatic stay).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A). If the case is a Chapter 7 case that is being refilled
under Chapter 13, this restriction does not apply. Id. The provision's scope is some-
what unclear, however, so the stay may remain in effect for some types of actions.
Napoli, supra note 35, at 767. Additionally, the statute does not define what it means
for a case to be "pending." Id. at 766.
37. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4). In cases where the debtor falls within the provisions
of id. § 362(c) a "party in interest" may petition the bankruptcy court for relief within
thirty days of the filing of the later case, provided the later case is filed in "good
faith." Id.
38. Michelle Singeltary, The Color of Money, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2006, at
20061 1105
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counseling would show potential bankruptcy claimants that they could re-
pay all (or most) of their debts without filing for bankruptcy. 39 These argu-
ments were supported by a study from the Credit Research Center which
found that approximately one quarter of Chapter 7 debtors could have re-
paid "at least 30 percent of their non-housing debts over a 5-year repayment
plan, after accounting for monthly expenses and housing payments. 4°
The credit counseling requirement is in the definition section of
BAPCPA and applies to all consumer debtors.41 Unless they fall within an
exception to the credit counseling requirement, debtors must receive credit
counseling from an approved credit counseling agency within the 180-day
• 42
period prior to filing their bankruptcy petitions. The United States trustee
is responsible for approving credit counseling agencies, and the clerk is
required to make a list of approved credit counseling agencies publicly
available.43 Individuals who fail to meet the credit counseling requirement
and who are not exempted from the credit counseling requirement are ineli-
gible to be debtors under the Bankruptcy Code.4
There are three exceptions to the credit counseling requirement, the
first of which applies to debtors who live in districts without an approved
credit counseling agency.45 The second exception to the credit counseling
requirement is a waiver of credit counseling that is granted by the bank-
46
ruptcy court. The bankruptcy court can grant a waiver when the debtor
demonstrates that he or she is burdened by exigent circumstances, and that
he or she requested, but was unable to receive counseling within five days
of making the request.47 Finally, the third exemption applies to debtors who
suffer from incapacity or disability, and to debtors who are active military
48
members serving in a military combat zone.
39. Id. This argument for the changes to the bankruptcy law is reflected in the
statements President Bush made when he signed BAPCPA. See supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
40. This study examined 3800 debtors who filed for bankruptcy in 1996, and was
funded by a grant from Visa and MasterCard. Jensen, supra note 32, at 520-21. The
study was featured during the 105th Congress's hearings on bankruptcy reform. Id. at
519-20. On the other hand, a study funded by the American Bankruptcy Institute
found that only 3.6 percent of Chapter 7 debtors would be able to pay their debts. Id.
at 521.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) (Supp. V 2005).
42. Id.
43. Id. § 11 l(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). The list of approved credit counsel-
ing agencies is also available on the United States Trustee Program's website at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/ccde/cc-approved.htm.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h).
45. Id. § 109(h)(2).
46. Id. § 109(h)(3).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 109(h)(4). An "incapacitated" debtor is one "impaired by reason of
mental illness or mental deficiency so that he is incapable of realizing and making
1106 [Vol. 71
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Three months after BAPCPA went into effect, the Washington Post ran
a story discussing the new credit counseling requirement. 49 The credit coun-
seling agencies quoted in the story reported seeing debtors for whom bank-
ruptcy truly was the best option, rather than the so-called "can-pay" debtors,
whom BAPCPA's supporters believed were abusing the bankruptcy laws.
50
In February, 2006, the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy At-
torneys (NACBA) issued a report on BAPCPA, which included the results
of NACBA's survey of ten credit counseling agencies. 5 1 The survey in-
cluded the following four questions:
1. How many debtors have you served since the new bankruptcy
law took effect on October 17, 2005?
2. Of those, what percentage would you estimate qualified for a
debt management plan, as opposed to filing for bankruptcy?
3. What percentage of people contacting you would you estimate
arrive as referrals from bankruptcy attorneys?
4. Roughly what percentage of people contacting you would you
say fall into the following categories:
* Circumstances beyond their control (e.g., loss of a job, medical
expenses, death, divorce or other change in marital status, in-
creased minimum payments on credit cards, predatory lending, and
so on)?
rational decisions with respect to his financial responsibilities" while a "disabled"
debtor is one who is "so physically impaired as to be unable, after reasonable effort,
to participate in an in person, telephone, or Internet briefing." Id.
49. Caroline E. Mayer, Bankruptcy Counseling Law Doesn't Deter Filings,
WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2006, at AO1.
50. Id. Several of the debtors mentioned in the story were facing imminent fore-
closure of their homes, while one debtor was a 60-year old disabled man with no
income or assets. Id. One counseling agency reported seeing so many debtors in such
dire financial straits that it waived the counseling fee in 60 percent of cases, while
another agency reported reducing the fee in half of the cases. Id.
51. NAT'L ASs'N OF CONSUMER BANKR. ATTORNEYS, BANKRUPTCY REFORM'S
IMPACT: WHERE ARE ALL THE "DEADBEATS"? 2 (2006), available at
http://nacba.com/files/main-page/022206NACBAbankruptcyreformstudy.pdf [here-
inafter BANKRUPTCY] (providing an analysis by the National Association of Con-
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* Circumstances within their control (e.g., reckless spending or
outright refusal to pay legitimate debts)? 52
The survey found that nearly ninety-seven percent of the over 60,000 debt-
ors served by the six credit counseling agencies were not eligible for a debt
management plan.53 Furthermore, only twenty-one percent of debtors were
seeking bankruptcy protection for circumstances within their control.54
While the above statistics suggest the ineffectiveness of the credit counsel-
ing requirement in reducing bankruptcies, recent bankruptcy court decisions
reveal the effects of the credit counseling requirement on individual debt-
ors.
C. Stricken or Dismissed?
Although BAPCPA requires an individual to receive credit counseling
prior to filing in order to be an eligible debtor, the Bankruptcy Code does
not specify how bankruptcy judges are supposed to treat a petition that is
filed by an ineligible debtor. As a result of this lack of clear legislative in-
tent, courts have split as to the proper way to treat individuals who file
bankruptcy petitions before receiving credit counseling. Some judges have
decided to dismiss these debtors' bankruptcy petitions, while others have
opted to "strike" the petitions to prevent BAPCPA's restrictions on the
automatic stay from taking effect.
In the Minnesota bankruptcy case In re LaPorta, the judge reached the
same result as the Gee decision regarding the proper treatment of an ineligi-
ble debtor.55 In LaPorta, a debtor who had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy
failed to obtain credit counseling prior to filing her bankruptcy petition.
56
The judge stated that the statute required "cause" for dismissal and that
failure to obtain credit counseling was sufficient cause to warrant dismissal
of the debtor's bankruptcy case.57 Although the judge acknowledged the
52. Id. at 5-6.
53. Id. at 2. This means that of the 60,000 debtors served by the responding
credit counseling agencies, just over 3 percent fell within the intent of the credit coun-
seling requirement which was to show individuals with the means to repay their debts
that filing for bankruptcy was unnecessary. Id.
54. Id. Two of the agencies reported that this category might be too broad, as
"consumers might have avoided debt but 'got in over their heads' over a period of
time without intending to do so." Id. at 6.
55. In re LaPorta, 332 B.R. 879, 882-83 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005).
56. Id. at 882. Chapter 7 debtors are subject to the same credit counseling re-
quirement as Chapter 13 debtors. Id. at 881; see 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) (Supp. V
2005).
57. LaPorta, 332 B.R. at 883-84.
1108 [Vol. 71
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harshness of this result he stated that because the statute was clear on its
face he lacked discretion to do anything but order dismissal.58
Shortly after issuing the Gee opinion, the same court issued a decision
regarding another debtor's eligibility under 11 U.S.C. § 109(h).5 9 This sec-
ond case, In re Talib, touched on the implications of the debtor's ineligibil-
ity. 6° Citing LaPorta, the court said that the debtor's failure to meet the
credit counseling requirement constituted cause for dismissal of the case.61
While he acknowledged that dismissal was a harsh result, he said that it was
the "only appropriate remedy given that the Debtor's failure to comply with
the provisions of § 109(h) cannot be cured subsequent to the filing."62
Although the decisions in LaPorta and Talib noted that a dismissal for
failure to meet the credit counseling requirement could have harsh results,
both judges failed to specify either what that result would be or how it
could be avoided. In contrast to these two decisions is the decision in In re
Valdez, a Chapter 13 case filed in the Southern District of Florida.63 In Val-
dez, the bankruptcy judge dismissed a debtor's pro se bankruptcy petition
for failure to meet the credit counseling requirement. 64 However, unlike
other similar dismissals, Judge Cristol said that "the Court will not consider
this a dismissed case in which the individual was the debtor, for purposes of
denying the imposition of the automatic stay in a subsequently filed case
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362.''65 Thus, even though the court dismissed the
bankruptcy petition, instead of striking it, the court's dismissal was in-
tended to have the effect of a stricken petition for the purposes of a subse-
quently filed case.
This approach was similar to the approach taken by Judge Monroe in
In re Sosa.66 In Sosa, the court dismissed a Chapter 13 case because of the
debtor's failure to obtain credit counseling prior to filing. 67 Judge Monroe
asked whether "any rational human being [could] make a cogent argument
that this makes any sense at all?' 68 Even so, Judge Monroe said that the
court's "hands [we]re tied" because the statute mandated dismissal of the
debtor's case.69
58. Id. at 884.
59. In re Talib, 335 B.R. 417 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005).
60. Id. at 424.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. In re Valdez, 335 B.R. 801 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005).
64. Id. at 802-03.
65. Id. at 803.
66. In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005).
67. Id. at 115.
68. Id. The bankruptcy judge was specifically concerned with the fact that,
should the debtor meet the eligibility requirements and re-file his case within a year,




Jeter-Boldt: Jeter-Boldt: Good in Theory, Bad in Practice
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Of the courts considering whether an ineligible debtor's case should be
dismissed or stricken for failure to complete credit counseling, two have
chosen to strike the ineligible debtor's bankruptcy petition. One of the cases
where the judge ordered that a debtor's petition be stricken was filed in the
Southern District of Texas. In In re Hubbard, a bankruptcy judge held that
five debtors who failed to obtain counseling before filing and who were
ineligible for waivers were to have their cases stricken rather than dis-
missed. 70 The judge reasoned that, while bankruptcy courts had previously
dismissed cases where debtors were ineligible, dismissal under BAPCPA
may have more serious implications for the debtor than under the former
act.71 Because the putative debtors in Hubbard were ineligible to be debtors
under BAPCPA, they never filed a case. 72 Because no case was com-
menced, no case could be dismissed.7 3
Finally, in In re Rios, a debtor's bankruptcy case was stricken by the
Southern District of New York.74 The Rios court agreed with Hubbard and
concluded that no bankruptcy can be commenced by an ineligible debtor.75
In so holding, the court discussed the implications of dismissing an ineligi-
ble debtor's case as opposed to striking the case. 76 One implication of dis-
missing a debtor's case is that if the debtor later becomes eligible for bank-
ruptcy and files a subsequent bankruptcy petition, the debtor will not re-
ceive the full protection of the automatic stay.77
D. Judicial Criticism of the Credit Counseling Requirement
Several recent cases have involved debtors facing imminent foreclo-
sure. 78 In these cases, individuals were trying to file Chapter 13 bankrupt-
cies to stop foreclosure sales of their homes.79 In some of these cases,
judges have voiced their opinions on the credit counseling requirement.




74. In re Rios, 336 B.R. 177 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2005).
75. Id. at 179.
76. Id. at 180.
77. Id.
78. In re Gee, 332 B.R. 602 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005); In re Valdez, 335 B.R.
801 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005); In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005).
79. When Congress created Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the ability to save one's
house from a foreclosure sale was supposed to entice a debtor to choose Chapter 13
bankruptcy over a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 118
(1978), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079. Congressional intent was that
more debtors would choose a Chapter 13 repayment plan so that they could stop fore-
closure. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. The debtors in Gee, Valdez,
and Sosa, however, were unable to file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition because of
1110 [Vol. 71
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In one such case, Judge Cristol of the Southern District of Florida dis-
missed a pro se debtor's Chapter 13 petition because of her failure to meet
the credit counseling requirement. s0 With respect to the credit counseling
requirement, Judge Cristol stated:
The Court wonders what exactly was intended by Congress in re-
gard to this Code section. Is it the intent of Congress that poor,
ignorant persons who do not know the law and cannot afford to
obtain the advice of counsel are to be denied protection and assis-
tance of the Bankruptcy Code which is available to more affluent
and better educated persons? Or, is it the intent of Congress that
decent, honest, hardworking persons who have suffered financial
misfortune or tragedy, be educated by budget and credit counsel-
ing services to help them determine if there is a more appropriate
way to deal with their financial problems? Sadly, the language in
the Code does not clearly reveal Congress' [s] intent; either the
Code was inartfully drafted or the congressional intent was in-
deed the former less compassionate, harsher result, rather than
the latter.
81
In this case, the credit counseling requirement prevented the debtor from
stopping a foreclosure sale by filing a Chapter 13 petition.
82
In In re Sosa, Judge Monroe of the Western District of Texas was just
83as direct. Sosa was another example of an individual attempting to stop a
foreclosure by filing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. 84 Judge Monroe
asserted that, "to call the Act a 'consumer protection' Act is the grossest of
misnomers," and he called "inane" the provision that prohibited a person
who had not received credit counseling from being a debtor "no matter how
dire the circumstances."
85
the credit counseling requirement. If the foreclosure sales are not stopped and these
debtors lose their homes, what incentive remains for these debtors to choose Chapter
13 bankruptcy if they are eligible to file Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions?
80. Valdez, 335 B.R. at 801.
81. Id. at 803.
82. It is important to remember that one of the ways the 1978 Act tried to entice
individuals into using Chapter 13 bankruptcy was by promising debtors they could
keep their homes. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 118 (1977), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079.
83. In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113, 115 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005).
84. Id. Judge Monroe also wrote that those who pushed for the passage of the act
"had their own agenda. It was apparently an agenda to make more money off the
backs of the consumers in this country." Id. at 114.
85. Id. Judge Monroe also said
[iut should be obvious to the reader at this point how truly concerned Congress is for
the individual consumers of this country. Apparently, it is not the individual consum-
2006]
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Gee, the Bankruptcy court for the Western District of Missouri de-
nied Bertha Mae Gee's request to waive the credit counseling require-
ment. 86 The court found that even if exigent circumstances were present, a
request for a waiver of the credit counseling requirement was insufficient
unless, prior to filing the petition, the debtor had requested credit counsel-
ing services and was unable to get them within five days. 87 The court
reached this conclusion by looking to the plain language of 11 U.S.C. §
109(h), the Bankruptcy Code's credit counseling provision.
88
The court said that, for a debtor to be eligible for a waiver, (1) exigent
circumstances must exist, (2) the debtor must have requested credit counsel-
ing services prior to filing bankruptcy and been unable to receive credit
counseling within five days of making the initial request, and (3) the certifi-
cation must be satisfactory to the court.
89
The court recognized that all three requirements must be met by the
debtor in order for the court to grant a waiver of the credit counseling re-
quirement. Despite finding that Gee's circumstances were exigent, the
court held that she did not meet the second requirement because she was
able to receive credit counseling within five days of requesting it.91 As a
result, the court found that Gee was ineligible to be a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Code.92
V. COMMENT
In re Gee was decided on October 26, 2005, nine days after BAPCPA
took effect.93 Because it was among the first debtor eligibility cases decided
under BAPCPA, Gee provided early insight into some of the issues that
bankruptcy judges will face under BAPCPA.
In his decision denying Gee's request for a waiver of the credit coun-
seling requirement, Judge Dow followed the plain text of the statute. The
ers of this country that make the donations to the members of Congress that allow
them to be elected and re-elected and re-elected and re-elected,
and ended his decision by noting "Congress must surely be pleased." Id. at 115.
86. In re Gee, 332 B.R. 602, 604 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. Each of these requirements must be detailed in the certification filed with




93. 332 B.R. 602 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005).
1112 [Vol. 71
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/13
CREDIT COUNSELING
statute clearly states that to be eligible for a waiver, a debtor must first
demonstrate that his or her circumstances are exigent. Additionally, the
debtor must prove that he or she requested credit counseling, but was un-
able to receive it within five days of the request. 94 Because Gee could have
received credit counseling within five days of making her request, she was
clearly ineligible to be a debtor.95 Thus, Gee was fairly unremarkable in its
ultimate result.
However, this case is noteworthy because it illustrates two fundamen-
tal questions raised by the credit counseling requirement. First, when debt-
ors fail to receive credit counseling prior to filing their bankruptcy petitions,
should the bankruptcy strike their petitions or dismiss them? Second, is the
credit counseling requirement achieving the result Congress intended, or is
it harming debtors like Bertha Mae Gee who are unable to receive counsel-
ing within the requisite time and are therefore forced to forgo the various
benefits of the bankruptcy code? This section analyzes these questions and
concludes that the credit counseling requirement is not having the desired
effect.
A. Stricken or Dismissed?
In Gee, the bankruptcy court ordered the debtor's case dismissed,
without any discussion of the implications of dismissal under BAPCPA.
96
At first glance, the "stricken" or "dismissed" terminology seems insignifi-
cant; however, in situations where an ineligible debtor becomes an eligible
debtor and files a second bankruptcy petition, this terminology may have a
huge impact on the debtor's second bankruptcy case. BAPCPA changed the
automatic stay provisions so that in situations where a debtor had a case
pending within the previous year and had the previously pending case dis-
missed, the debtor would not receive the full automatic stay.
97
The decisions discussed earlier demonstrate the different ways bank-
ruptcy judges have decided to interpret 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)'s credit counsel-
ing requirement. Even among courts that dismissed ineligible debtors' peti-
tions, there is disagreement as to what a judge can do to mitigate the poten-
tially harsh results of a dismissal.98 However, the full impact of these deci-
94. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) (Supp. V 2005).
95. Id.
96. Gee, 332 B.R. at 603.
97. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
98. Even the two cases that were most critical of the credit counseling require-
ments and its harsh effects differed in how to approach the requirement. In In re Sosa,
Judge Monroe discussed the effect a dismissal would have on a later-filed bankruptcy
petition, but concluded that his "hands are tied." 336 B.R. 113, 115 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 2005). Cf In re Valdez, 335 B.R. 801 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that
dismissal was not to count against the debtor for purposes of limiting the automatic
stay in a later-filed case).
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sions will not be known unless these (or similarly situated) ineligible debt-
ors become eligible debtors in a bankruptcy case filed within one year of
their previously filed cases. When this occurs, bankruptcy judges will be
forced to interpret the automatic stay provisions under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c).99
In these situations, some judges may conclude that because the later-
filed petition was filed in good faith, the debtor should receive relief from
the automatic stay restrictions. If judges grant relief as a matter of course,
then the debate over whether an ineligible debtor's petition should be
"stricken" or "dismissed" will be moot. l°° On the other hand, if bankruptcy
judges fail to freely grant relief from the limitations imposed on the auto-
matic stay, then whether a petition should be "stricken" or "dismissed" will
take on greater importance. Because the statute states that a pending case
must have been "dismissed" for the automatic stay restrictions to apply, a
strict construction of the statute would mean that "stricken" petitions would
not fall within the statute, and would not be subject to § 362(c)'s restric-
tions on the automatic stay.
B. The Credit Counseling Requirement
While the goal of the credit counseling requirement--encouraging in-
dividuals with the means to repay their debts to refrain from filing bank-
ruptcy-is certainly laudable, BAPCPA's drafters did not seem to consider
the possibility that credit counseling might not make a difference for a sub-
stantial number of debtors.
Supporters of the credit counseling requirement contend that cases
such as Valdez and Sosa will prove to be outliers. They argue that, because
those who filed for bankruptcy after BAPCPA took effect are "the poorest
of the poor," they are "not a fully representative sample of the filers." 
°1
Furthermore, even if individuals currently filing for bankruptcy turn out to
be a representative sample of future debtors, the credit industry argues that
99. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (Supp. V 2005) restricts the length of the automatic stay
in situations where a debtor had a bankruptcy case pending within the previous year
that was dismissed.
100. However, even if bankruptcy judges freely grant debtors relief from the re-
strictions in § 362(c), it might not help debtors such as Mirielys Valdez who was too
poor to obtain counsel in filing her first bankruptcy petition. In re Valdez, 335 B.R.
801, 803 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005). Ms. Valdez failed to meet the credit counseling
requirement because she was unaware of the credit counseling requirement. Id. at 802.
It is not hard to imagine that debtors such as Ms. Valdez, who become eligible after
learning the hard way about a credit counseling requirement, might still lack the funds
or the knowledge to file a motion for relief from § 362(c) and therefore might not
receive the protection of the automatic stay.
101. Philip S. Corwin, expert for American Banker's Association, quoted in Caro-
line E. Mayer, Bankruptcy Counseling Law Doesn't Deter Filings, WASH. POST, Jan.
17, 2006, at A01.
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the counseling requirement is beneficial because "an informed consumer is
a better consumer."
'1 2
As with the "stricken" versus "dismissed" discussion earlier, only time
will tell whether Judge Monroe or the credit industry is correct regarding
the credit counseling requirement. However, even if the credit industry is
correct in its assertion that most debtors benefit from a pre-bankruptcy
credit counseling requirement, this benefit is not substantial enough to jus-
tify the effects on debtors for whom credit counseling has no benefit. For
debtors facing imminent foreclosure, like the debtors in Sosa and Valdez,
credit counseling will not be beneficial. There will always be people who
will wait until the last possible moment to attempt to stop a foreclosure sale
by filing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. Therefore, instead of helping
debtors, the credit counseling requirement acts as a bar to Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy and keeps these debtors from saving their homes from foreclosure.
This is in direct contrast to the original intent of Chapter 13, which was to
make it more attractive by permitting debtors to stop a foreclosure sale. 103
Additionally, the credit counseling requirement will harm innocent
victims of natural disasters. For example, bankruptcy filing rates for hurri-
cane-affected areas tend to increase twelve to thirty-six months after the
hurricane. 1°4 A credit counseling session, designed to help individuals find
ways to live within their means and control their spending, will not help
someone whose home was destroyed by a natural disaster. While there is no
question that consumer credit education can be a useful tool, requiring
credit counseling prior to filing for bankruptcy seems to be doing more
harm than good. A less harmful way of achieving the good intention of the
credit counseling requirement would be to focus on educating consumers
after they file for bankruptcy. This way, debtors facing imminent foreclo-
sure could still save their homes through a Chapter 13 bankruptcy and re-
ceive the education to become financially solvent after receiving the fresh
start that bankruptcy should provide. Additionally, concerns about debtors
abusing the bankruptcy system could be met by strengthening penalties for
debtors who clearly abuse the bankruptcy system. This two-pronged ap-
proach would best serve the underlying goal of the Bankruptcy Code.
102. Steve Bartlett, president of Financial Services Roundtable, quoted in Mayer,
supra note 101.
103. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. The counter-argument is that
debtors who are facing foreclosure had plenty of time before foreclosure to obtain
credit counseling if they wanted to file Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions and thus,
Chapter 13 is still as an attractive an option as it was prior to BAPCPA.
104. Robert M. Lawless, Bankruptcy Filing Rates After a Major Hurricane, 6
NEV. L.J. 7, 15 (2005).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In her testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Elizabeth
Warren told Congress "I think you will find that most debtors are filing for
bankruptcy not because they had too many Rolex watches and Gameboys,
but because they had no choice. You have a choice. It's a choice that you're
making for the American people."
10 5
Although judges may attempt to find ways around the harshest out-
comes of BAPCPA, Congress must choose to change the credit counseling
requirement. This requirement has the potential to be a useful part of the
bankruptcy proceedings, but Congress should amend the Code to make the
credit counseling requirement work. Until Congress makes this choice, the
credit counseling requirement will continue to have the unintended conse-
quence of working against the main purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.
KATHERINE A. JETER-BOLDT
105. BANKRUPTCY, supra note 51, at 3.
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